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Abstract  
 
This research points out the limitation of “Early Modernization Theory” by studying Korea’s 
“Nepotism”, an East-Asia’s traditional community culture based on school tie, regional tie 
and blood tie. This research looks into how nepotism has continued even after modernization, 
examining the limitation of early modernization theory which argues that economic 
development leads to overall change of the society such as social value, culture and level of 
people’s awareness. Korea has achieved rapid economic growth in half a century, 
experiencing huge societal transformation. However, nepotism is still clearly found in Korean 
social relationships and power-related corruptions. Participation rate for nepotism network 
such as alumni gathering of school or native places is the highest, recording around 31% in 
two researches conducted in 2006 and 2015. In addition, nepotism connection is abused in 
business world, which is shown in power-related corruption examples such as Nara Banking 
Corporation’s illegal lobby incident and Presidential Election bribery incident in 2002. 
Korea’s nepotism has been solidified during the historical hardship periods such as Japanese 
colonization, Korean War, and government-led rapid economic development, as public 
institutions have not been trustworthy. It is supported by the fact that Korean social capital is 
“narrow-and-thick”, centered on nepotism relationships, while the confidence in major social 
organizations is at a low level. This research concludes that early modernization theory which 
assumes exclusive relationships between “traditionality” and “modernity” and suggests 
economic and technological development driven by industrialization leads to modernization 
of overall society does not fully explain Korea’s modernization.        
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1. Introduction  
 
A. Research Background  
South Korea has achieved rapid economic development after Korean War in the 
1950s. Between 1953 and 2017, GDP per capita was 440 times increased. Also, life 
expectancy increased from below 50 years to over 80 years (GKEDC, 2019a). A country that 
used to depend on foreign aid is now an aid donor country that has achieved both economic 
development and democratization (GKEDC, 2019a). Its rapid industrialization in half a 
century is the history of catch-up and innovation, which compressed 200 years of Western 
society’s industrialization (GKEDC, 2019b).  
However, many kinds of socio-economic problems are found in Korean society such 
as the gap between the rich and poor, social conflicts, low social capital, etc. Particularly, low 
social capital indicates that people do not trust in their country as well as affiliated 
community, which impedes sustainable economic development. Korean social capital is 
characterized as “narrow and thick” type, which indicates that Korean have high confidence 
in their family, relatives, school alumni and other close relationships which share the same 
background, whereas they rarely trust in strangers, foreigner, or other different group of 
people. For this reason, Korean society is regarded as it is under the influence of “familism” 
as Southern Italia which was studied by Putnam.  
This research will look into “nepotism” which stems from “familism” (Science of 
Public Administration Dictionary, 2009). This research will study how nepotism was 
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formulated and has been continued, and how it is found in social relationships and power-
related corruption. It will be investigated that what kinds of networks are the most notable in 
Korean society, and how nepotism network is found in power-related corruptions. Shedding 
light on if Korea’s traditional culture, “Nepotism”, is rampant in the society, this research will 
prove the limitation of early modernization theory. The early modernization theory suggests 
that economic development leads to the overall modernization of a society.  
Even though nepotism is general phenomenon of a society, this study wants to look 
into the aspect of Korea’s modern history that impeded growth of social capital and instead 
made people rely on their private network. Korea went through a series of challenges such as 
the U.S. military regime after Japanese colonization, Korean War, and extensive state 
intervention in the economy during the rapid economic growth periods. In this situation, 
Korean did not have a choice but to rely on the traditional networks such as blood tie or 
regional tie rather than forming desirable civic communities.  
The research approaches to explore this topic are the following: a. analyze survey 
data of the Korean social relationships and identify which social activities are the most 
dominant in Korea, b. study Korean corruption cases that serve as representative side-effects 
of nepotism. 
The results from this study indicate that social and cultural aspects of the society and 
people’s level of awareness may not keep up with the socio-economic development. This 
stands in comparison to the points made in modernization theory.    
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B. Research Questions  
This research tackles two major questions: a. Does nepotism still linger in the 
Korean society? b. Is modernization theory applicable in the Korean society?  
First, this research looks into Korean social relationships and corruption cases, 
specifically power-related corruption in order to identify whether nepotism is still a dominant 
factor in Korea. Second, this paper seeks to conclude whether modernization theory is valid 
in the Korean context.  
 
C. Research Methods  
Case studies were utilized as the compass to see whether nepotism is rampant in the 
Korean society and how power-related corruption takes place by forming elite cartel based on 
regionalism, school relations, kinship, etc. The research methods are divided into two: a. 
analyzing survey data gathered from Korea Development Institute(KDI) and Statistics Korea. 
This paper categorizes social activities according to its characteristics; whether the activity 
was conducted for private interest or for public good, and whether it displayed nepotism 
tendencies. b. studying the cause of power-related corruptions by investigating previous 
research and news articles. Since nepotism is a cultural factor of corruption, this research 
will deal with how nepotism triggers power-related corruption.  
 
2. Theoretical Arguments on Modernization Theory and the Definition of Major Concepts 
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A. Modernization Theory 
Modernization theory is a concept that stretches beyond economic and technological 
development. According to Kaufmann (1997), the modernization theory is defined as:  
The assumption of a gradual and directed transformation of all societies which come in 
contact with the blessings and risks of modern knowledge and technologies, and this in the 
same direction that has been paved first by the core regions of Europe.  
The term “Modernization” is only of recent usage. For a long time, it was termed 
“industrialization” (Kaufmann, 1997). As the term implies, modernization theory deals with 
enormous transformation of society, from traditional to modern, which involves the change of 
global society. In this research, the theory indicates early modernization theory if it is not 
specifically mentioned.   
Historically, modernization shares close bond with the rise of industrialization. 
Industrialization refers to lifestyles that bring profound changes in economy, society, politics, 
and culture (Krishan). As this social phenomenon kicks in, people are exposed to various 
outputs from industrialization and are often inclined to change their social behaviors. 
Likewise, modernization theory also argues that economic growth leads to overall societal 
change such as social and cultural aspects and people’s level of awareness.  
Another major argument of the modernization theory is that the developing countries 
will ultimately follow the development path of European countries which achieved 
modernization earlier than other countries from 18th century. There are two major results that 
sprung out from the European modernization; economic growth and democracy. 
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According to Suh (2014), modernization theory asserts that the development process 
brings about a sort of “conversion” which indicates that every society treads an identical path 
of industrialization and democratization. Knoebl and Trigillia (2000) mentions that social 
change towards modernity in different societies will take place in a rather uniform and linear 
manner. This argument assumes that a traditional society of a developing country is inferior 
to a modernized society of a developed country, suggesting the current developed country is 
the blueprint for the developing country. Since early modernization theory asserts that a 
traditional society is transferred to a modern society through industrialization, early 
modernization theory argues that “tradition” and “modernity” are two conflicting ideas that 
cannot co-exist. According to Suh (2014), the modernization theory regards traditionality as 
stationary and undifferentiated, and the fact that many traditional societies function under 
reasonable and modernized system is easily neglected. 
 Early modernization theory was criticized due to its simplicity which does not regard 
external environment of each society as an important factor to make a difference of 
development path. For this reason, “late modernization theory” compensates the defect of 
early modernization theory, recognizing various development paths and alleviating the 
dichotomous way of thinking about traditionality and modernity. While the theory recognizes 
that many societies of developing countries have both modern and traditional factors with the 
difference of the extent, it admits that development paths can be divergent based on the 
external environment of every society. 
 
B. Elaborating the Major Concepts 
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i. Nepotism  
In this research, Nepotism means discriminatory and exclusive attitude based on 
regionalism and school ties. There is a similar term in Western society, “clientelism”1, which 
means relationship between individuals with unequal economic and social status such as “the 
boss” and his “subordinate” that entails the reciprocal exchange of goods and services based 
on a personal link that is generally perceived in terms of moral obligation.2 It is similar in 
that both means relationships built by personal link and pursuing exclusive benefits. It can be 
disadvantageous throughout the society.  
As it is defined, “Clientelism” takes place in the circumstance of “asymmetric power 
relationships”. However, nepotism does not always happen in that situation. Also, while 
clientelism is based on reciprocal exchange between the person directly involved, nepotism 
occurs with the expectation of potential benefits from a third party sharing the same 
connection. This is the difference between the two concepts.  
 
ii. Familism 
Familism is divided into two meanings. In a narrow sense, it means family-centered 
principle of life that does not recognize the independence of family members, rather regards 
                                           
1 Briquet Jean-Louis. Definition of “Clientelism”. Retrieved from 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/clientelism  
2 Briquet Jean-Louis. Definition of “Clientelism”. Retrieved from 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/clientelism 
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family as an ideal community. In a broad sense, it includes the tendency to enhance and apply 
the principle to other kinds of social relationships (Kang, 2007). According to Kwon (2016), 
the relationships range from kinship to company and even country.  
Practically, familism appears as family-centered thought, family egoism. It is 
dominant that Korean try to find solutions for the social issues based on family-centered 
thoughts, not demanding for societal solution. For example, many of Korean parents send 
their children to private tutoring in order for them to enter privileged university, thinking that 
it is the only thing that guarantees successful life of their children. They do not approach the 
social safety net issue or demand enough quality jobs as whole civic community.  
Nepotism is rooted from familism which, as defined earlier, tends to apply the 
principle among family members to other kinds of group. For this reason, it works to improve 
the human relationship within the group. On the other hand, it may hinder the reasonability 
and fairness of the organization management due to its factional strife.   
 
iii. Social Capital  
Social capital refers to all kinds of social assets that make it possible for the member 
of a society to cooperate among themselves. OECD defines social capital as “networks 
together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or 
among group”.3 The norms include unspoken and largely unquestioned rules as well as 
                                           
3 OECD. What is social capital?. OECD Insights: Human Capital  
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tangible regulations. The norms are existing within any kind of group. For example, 
protecting children from harm is a universal norm of many societies.  
Social trust is the core concept of social capital.4 In this study, social capital means 
social trust in other individuals and confidence in social organizations such as government, 
journal, court, etc.   
 
iv. Corruption  
There are two meanings of corruption: a. All kinds of illegal or unjust behaviors 
which aim for giving physical or social benefits such as property, social status, and 
opportunity to very limited group of people (Anti-corruption & Civil Rights Commission, 
2006), b. public officials’ abuse of power over administration in order to get unfair and 
irregular benefits. In this research, corruption is not defined to public officials’ abuse of 
power. It is comprehensive term embracing improper pursuing of benefits by private as well 
as public sectors.   
 
C. Literature Review 
There have been a number of researches that dealt with Korea’s modernization 
process. Studies are mostly against typical arguments of modernization theory. They argue 
that Korea’s modernization went down a different path to that of western counterparts, due to 
                                           
4 Concept of Social Capital. The Korea Economic Daily.  
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their historical differences.  
According to Lee (2006), the perception of “individual”, “society”, and “country” 
differs between Korea and the Western world. Lee (2006) suggests that understanding of 
these three concepts was absent to the Korean people. They were first introduced during the 
timeline between the liberation from the Japanese colonial rule and the establishment of the 
new democratic government, the Republic of Korea.  
The concept of “individual” is viewed in Korea as “a part of a community”. More 
than personal traits, the circle which the individual was affiliated with defined who the person 
was. Whereas in the western culture, the “individuals” stood more independent, and the circle 
which the person was affiliated with bore relatively less significance. 
“Society” in Korea, according to above context refers to an interest group around 
oneself. Western countries underwent symbolic historical events such as the French 
Revolution and the U.S. Independence that formulated the idea that “society” was an 
“achievement” rather than something that was given. On the other hand, in Korea at the time, 
such concept of society did not exist. Heavily influenced by Confucianism, “society” was 
“part of nature”, an environment that surrounded their existence. The fundamental differences 
of how individuals viewed society in the two cultures stemmed here. Westerners viewed that 
the “society” was a tool to meet their individual interest, whereas in Korea “society” was the 
greater good to make contributions to. 
The term “country” also holds different value between societies. In Korea, it is 
regarded as an extension of a “family”. It was considered a social norm. In this sense, 
individual was obligated to serve the collective duty. Any form of individuality apart from the 
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collective good of the country was considered deviant and was not a luxury one could afford. 
Instead, for Koreans, “country” defined the rights they may exercise and duty they had to 
bear. On the other hand, the time of enlightenment in the west served as the foundation in 
which the westerners viewed their “country”. Such views stemmed from the theories of social 
contract which was the bedrock of “The Declaration of the Rights of Man” during the French 
revolution and “The Declaration of Independence” in the United States.  
Lee (2006) served a reason how Korea’s modernization could be different from 
Western modernization. Even though Korea’s artificial culture, value system, and even way 
of thinking seemed like changing drastically during the modernization, the new concepts 
“individual”, “society”, and “country” were accepted differently among the societies due to 
their historical and cultural differences. 
Meanwhile, Kim (2010) mentioned more clearly the existence of nepotism 
population in Korean society. Kim (2010) suggests two distinct groups have formed during 
Korea’s modernization. He divided the two groups into “traditional nepotism population”, a 
popular characteristic for during hardships to utilize conventional networks such as blood ties 
for survival, and the new “networking population”, a group of people with tendencies to 
pursue one’s own identity and benefits by autonomous association beyond the traditional 
identity group such as school or family. The new networking population appeared after the 
informatization era from the late 1980s, which signaled the advent of internet and democracy. 
Kim (2010) concludes that, these two groups in discord constitute the Korean society, and in 
time may merge into a new and single identity.  
It is to be highlighted that Kwon (2017) cautions looking into the Korean case 
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through western lenses by criticizing the Western-centrism which in most cases regards 
“Modernization” as “Westernization”. According to Kwon (2017), Many Korean traditional 
values and principles possessed modern aspects in their system. “Gye(mutually beneficial 
neighborhood)”, “Imperial examination”, and “Bureaucracy” in Joseon dynasty are the 
persuasive examples that Kwon (2017) presented. In detail, Gye is characterized as 
autonomous, equal and common-rule based community. These traits are the foundations of 
many civic groups’ or communities’ manage principle in modern society. Also, imperial 
examination was merit-based national examination to select public officials during Koryo and 
Joseon dynasty. It had been existent from 958 A.C. during the Koryo dynasty. Bureaucracy is 
also representative manage principle of public and private organizations in modern society.  
Moreover, during the period of modernization, while the west underwent the spread 
of individualism where “rational and independent individuals” were considered ideal, in 
Korea, remnants of traditional familism still lingers to this day. To add to this argument about 
the modernization theory, Kwon (2017) explains that Korea’s modernity is instead mixture of 
diverse form of modernity, mainly historical, colonial, and “American”.  
This kind of argument indicating the uniqueness of Korea’s modernization different 
from Western counterparts has been studied. Hong (2017) also argues that Korea’s 
modernization is fundamentally different from its Western counterparts. This is due to the 
absence of individualism as it is a very rare phenomenon in the Korean history. Many 
characterize this as the “individualization with lack of individualism” or “individualization 
divided from familism” (Hong, 2017). Hong (2017) also asserts that the constitution of Korea 
as a modernized nation was granted by alien powers, and the authoritarian regime established 
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by the military coup pursued modernization 10 years after the establishment of the 
democratic state. As a result, although Korea had successfully industrialized its economy, it 
lacked political, economic, and cultural liberty. Modern individualism culture was only 
existent among elite groups.  
As discussed above, there have been many critical researches regarding Korea’s 
modernization. Korea walked a different path from its western pioneers as they had their 
unique historical backgrounds and inherent factors. Not only that, it is persuasive that the 
concepts of “individual”, “society” and “country” were accepted differently from Western 
society during the modernization. According to Suh (2014), one of the major characteristics 
of modernization theory is “abstractness” which mainly becomes the reason to be criticized. 
The argument of modernization theory that developing countries follow the Western linear 
development path with “economic development” and “democracy” as its two axes is abstract. 
For this reason, this research attempts to suggest specific examples of nepotism in the Korean 
society.  
While previous researches try to analyze how Korea’s modernization process is 
distinct from the Western society by looking into its historical backgrounds, this research 
attempts to examine Korea’s nepotism displayed in social relationships and power-related 
corruptions, which is an evidence that modernization theory does not fully explain Korea’s 
modernization.  
 
3. Nepotism and Korea’s Social Capital 
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A. The Origin of Nepotism 
The term “nepotism”, in this paper, specifically deals with “closed and exclusive 
network” and thus it is desirable to distinguish it from “open and universal network”. 
According to Lim (1988), nepotism is a universal characteristic portrayed in mankind to use 
social relationships as a “beneficial connection”. Yet, the nature of nepotism may differ by 
regions and cultures. For example, a big difference between Korean and Western society is 
that Korean nepotism is fueled by regionalism or school ties, whereas in the western 
nepotism is driven by authority and wealth.  
According to encyclopedia of Korean Culture, nepotism is complicated network of 
traditional social relationship. There have been arguments that Korean nepotism came from 
an ideology, such as Confucianism, but the modern interpretation is that nepotism is not 
solely from an ideology but rather was assembled through series of historical experiences. 
Those exemplary events are: corruption in late Joseon dynasty, Japanese colonization, the 
Korean war, and rapid industrialization led by the authoritarian government. A common 
distinction between these events is that they are considered time of socio-economic hardship 
to general population. Accordingly, they lost trust in their governors and thus turned to 
private networks to survive. 
 
B. The Reason of Formation and Continuation of Nepotism in the Korean Society  
Why is nepotism still existent even after modernization in the Korean society? If 
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modernization theory is correct, social relationship should extend to broader civil 
communities beyond exclusive network based on nepotism as Western counterparts have 
done.  
In this chapter, it will be studied where nepotism originated from and how it has been 
existent after modernization (1950s ~ present). First, there are different arguments regarding 
the origin of nepotism; whether it stems from Confucianism, which is an East-Asian culture, 
or not. Some explains that the side effect of nepotism such as corruption originates from 
Confucianism, because the thought put importance on personal relationships and familism. 
On the other hand, it is also said that since Confucianism distinguishes “public” and “private” 
sector in its foundation of philosophy, it is not desirable to see Confucianism as the cause of 
corruption. 
However, in regard to the continuation of nepotism, it has been studied that how 
nepotism has lasted in contemporary Korean society is related to Korea’s historical 
backgrounds. According to Jang (2008), there are two different approaches to explain 
evolution of nepotism: a. institutionalist approach, b. structuralist approach. Institutionalist 
approach argues that nepotism has been evolved as a strategic decision in order to reduce the 
uncertainty caused from undeveloped public institutions, which means that a country has not 
been trustworthy to the people as a modern state. 
Structuralist approach suggests that the evolution of nepotism can be understood as a 
survival strategy of individuals who react to structural change of economic environment. 
Meanwhile, Jang (2008) suggests “historic path dependency” perspective which argues that 
nepotism has been reproduced going through a series of different historical accidents. 
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Previous pattern of behaviors continues to subsequent events as people learn from the 
experience. For example, people’s dependence on private network during the bureaucratic 
authoritarian state in 1960~80s, relies on previous determination in the historical path such as 
the pattern of behaviors – counting on private network - during the Japanese colonization to 
be survived.  
Jang (2008) asserts that Korea’s nepotism is attributed to unprepared public 
institutions and the distrust of authority, as the society at the time have gone through 
corruption in the late Joseon Royal Court and self-devouring party strife of high-ranking 
bureaucrats, Japanese colonization and liberation, and the Korean War. The era is 
characterized as the times of “exploitation”. To be more detailed, Jang (2008) explains that 
Korea’s nepotism of those era - narrow and thick social trust - should be understood as a 
series of people’s decision who want to guarantee their safety net and survival under the 
specific historical environments. At that time, the authority was not trustworthy to the public. 
That is why Korean people rely on nepotism network whereas they do not trust the social 
system (Kim, 1996; 102-106).  
 
C. Korea’s Social Capital  
 In order to see general trust level of the Korean society, this research looks into trust 
level on general population and confidence in representative social organizations. First, 
regarding trust level on general population, trust level had been decreased gradually from 1982 
to 2010 for around 30 years. As of 2010, 73% of the respondents replied that “Generally 
speaking, people are not trustworthy”. This figure is much higher than that as of 1982 which 
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recorded 58.7%. This indicates that trust level on general population has been declined since 
30 years ago.  
 
 [Table 1] Response to “Generally speaking, do you think people are trustworthy?”  
 
(Source: World Value Survey)  
 
Meanwhile, in a survey result conducted by Statistics Korea from 2013 to 2015, 4.4% 
of the respondents said “Generally, people are trustworthy.” while 61.8% of them replied “They 
are somewhat trustworthy”. Also, 31.5% of them responded “They are not that trustworthy”. 
In other words, it is found that trust level on general population is not that high in the Korean 
society.  
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 [Table 2] Response to “Generally speaking, are other people trustworthy?  
(Unit: %, point)  
Year 
Not trustworthy 
at all 
Not that 
trustworthy 
Somewhat 
trustworthy 
Trustworthy a 
lot 
Average score 
(in total: 4) 
2013 2.5 25.3 66.8 5.4 2.8 
2014 2.9 23.5 67.4 6.2 2.8 
2015 2.2 31.5 61.8 4.4 2.7 
(Source: Statistics Korea) 
 
There is another research to be focused. Trust level of people differs for each group. 
People replied that they trust in their family as indicated in the survey data. It reached 99.3% 
as of 2005 and 97.7% as of 2010. This figure is much higher than the trust level on other group 
of people. Particularly, trust level on strangers is very low, recording 14.9% as of 2005 and 19% 
as of 2010. There is a significant gap between two indicators; trust level on one’s own family 
and that on strangers. It indicates that Korean highly trust in their family, whereas they rarely 
trust strangers whom they do not have any link.  
In a country where civil society is matured, people tend to trust others even in the case 
they are not acquaintance. Meanwhile, the type of Korean trust is “thick-and-narrow”. They 
trust in their family or acquaintance a lot, but they are defensive about strangers who are seen 
different in kind.  
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[Picture 1] Trust Level for Each Group of People (In 2005 and 2010) 
(Source: World Value Survey)  
 
The following is Korean social confidence in major social organizations such as central 
government, parliament, the court, police, political party and conglomerates. It is the response 
to the question “Do you trust in each social organization?” The result shows the rate of 
respondents who replied “Totally agree” or “quite agree” to the question. It indicates that 
Korean does not have that high level of confidence in major social organizations, especially 
parliament, central government and political party. 
More than 70% of people replied that they have little confidence in parliaments after 
1990. Also, people trusted in political party at the lowest level among various public institutions. 
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Trust level on central government did not exceed more than 50% during the whole survey 
periods. Trust level on conglomerates had been fallen until 2001, but increased after the period. 
The result indicates that people do not have confidence in public institutions, especially the 
high-rank figures such as congressmen, politicians and the judge. This low confidence in high-
rank groups is related to the discussion on power-related corruption in the following case study.  
 
[Picture 2] The Rate of Confidence in Each Social Organization 
(Source: WVS, Statistics Korea)  
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A. Two Kinds of Social Networks  
Social network can be divided into two categories. 1) Particularistic and exclusive 
network based on nepotism, 2) Inclusive and universal relationship based on people’s 
thoughts and ideas. According to Park (2000), the Particularistic and exclusive network based 
on nepotism refers to a certain type of “restriction” or “innate standard” that one must meet 
such as regional connections or family ties. Vice versa inclusive and universal relationship is 
a network of which joining qualification is achievable and universal.  
The meaning of latter is similar with “network agent” in the research of Kim (2010). 
Even though the connection based on school tie belongs to “achievable network” which is 
inclusive and universal relationship, its characteristic is actually “exclusive”, distinguishing 
clearly the members of the group from the others. That is why it is regarded as particularistic 
and closed network.    
There are some examples of nepotism. As discussed earlier, nepotism is a universal 
phenomenon that is found in other cultural area as well as East-Asia influenced by the 
Confucian culture. However, East-Asian countries are unique in that nepotism based on 
school tie, blood tie, and regionalism is rampant in the societies. For example, according to 
Han (2004), Japan, China and Korea have very strong nepotism based on blood ties in the 
corporation networks. Looking into the difference among each country, it is studied that 
Korea is relatively highly affected by “school tie” and “regionalism”, while another strong 
connection in Japan is “company tie” which is formed among the member of same 
companies.  
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The representative example of “open and universal relationship” is civic group. It 
does not require some given or strict conditions to become its members. If someone agrees to 
its activities and thoughts and follows a series of regulation of the group, they can become the 
members. Being the member of the group is not privileged nor exclusive. 
 
B. Analysis on Korean Social Relationships 
There are two researches which investigated Korea’s social capital in 2006 and 2015. 
They surveyed Korean people of how much they are participatory in various social group 
activities such as alumni meeting, club activities, etc. The research institutions are KDI as of 
2006 and Statistics Korea as of 2015.  
First, KDI implemented comprehensive survey of Korean social capital in 2006. It 
researched the participation rate for various group activities which can be categorized as 
following; private group, interest group, civic group, political party and nepotism network.  
According to this categorization, there is distinct difference in the participation rate of 
each group activity; nepotism network recorded the highest participation rate (31.6%), and the 
second greatest is reached by private group (25.75%) followed by interest group (7.24%), 
political party (3.9%), and civic group (3.7%).  
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[Table 3] Participation Rate of Various Social Groups (As of 2006) 
(Unit: %) 
Group Kinds of social groups Participation rate Average 
Private 
network 
Sports, outdoor leisure club activities 24.6 25.75 
 
 
 
Cultural activities, sharing hobby club activities 22.9 
Religious group 26.7 
Cyber community 28.8 
Interest 
group 
Labor union 5.9 
7.24 
 
 
 
 
Enterpriser, merchant, farmer, and professional 
group 
7.5 
Education, Teacher, School parent group 8.1 
Resident group of apartment 11.8 
retired soldiers group 2.9 
Civic group 
Consumer group 2.6 
3.7 
 
 
 
 
International aid, human rights group 3.7 
Environmental and animal protection group 2.3 
Voluntary group for youth, retiree, senior 
citizens, and women 
4.5 
Voluntary group for saving the poverty 5.4 
Political 
party 
Political party 3.9 3.9 
Nepotism 
network 
Alumni gathering of school 52.7 31.6 
 
 
Alumni gathering of native place 18.5 
Clan gatherings 23.7 
31 
 
 
(Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2006)  
 
This result indicates that Korean actively participate in nepotism network and private 
group while they are not so participatory in civic group, political party and interest group 
activities. In order to see the change along with time series, this research looks into the data 
published in 2015.  
According to Korean Statistical Information Service (2015), it was surveyed that the 
participation rate for alumni of school and native place records the highest participation rate 
among various social groups. It reaches 31.3% which is much greater than the participation 
rate for other groups such as private groups (18.9%), civic group (6.3%), interest group (3%), 
and political party (1.6%). The result is very similar in that both survey results show that 
participation rate for nepotism network is the highest, followed by private group among various 
social group activities.    
  
[Table 4] Participation Rate of Various Social Groups (As of 2015) 
(Unit: %) 
Group Kinds of social groups 
Have 
Membership but 
not participate 
Participation 
rate 
Group 
Average 
Political 
party 
Political party 3.6 1.6 1.6 
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Nepotism 
network 
Alumni gathering of school and 
native place 
14.9 31.3 31.3 
Interest 
group 
Enterprisers, labor union, 
professional groups 
4.7 3 3 
Private 
network  
Religious group 8.1 17.7 
18.85 
Club activities 7.4 20 
Civic group 
Civic movement group 2.4 2.2 
6.3 
Civic societal group 6.3 7.8 
Voluntary work and donation 
group 
4.6 11.9 
Social market economy group 3.1 3.3 
(Source: Korean Statistical Information Service)  
 
As indicated earlier, the participation rate for nepotism network is the highest 
recording around 31% in two surveys, although the investigation periods have around 10 
years of gap. Another distinctive result is the low participation rate for public associations 
such as civic groups and political party, which record 3~6% in case of civic groups and 1~4% 
in political party. This indicates that Korean are not so participatory in civic group activities 
for social common goals.  
 
5. Power-Related Corruption and Nepotism 
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A. Why Power-Related Corruption?  
Transparency International, a representative corruption research institute, reports that 
Korea’s corruption perception index scored 57 as of 2018 (Transparency International, 2018). 
The number did increase since 2015, but Korea is still in the middle-high bracket at 45th place 
out of around 130 countries. Among the OECD countries, South Korea ranks 30th out of 36 
countries. 
 
[Table 5] Corruption Perception Index of OECD countries (As of 2018) 
Rank 2018 Country 
CPI Score 
2018 
1 Denmark 88 
2 New Zealand 87 
3 Finland 85 
3 Sweden 85 
3 Switzerland 85 
7 Norway 84 
8 Netherlands 82 
9 Canada 81 
9 Luxembourg 81 
11 Germany 80 
11 United Kingdom 80 
13 Australia 77 
14 Austria 76 
14 Iceland 76 
17 Belgium 75 
18 Estonia 73 
18 Ireland 73 
18 Japan 73 
21 France 72 
22 United States of America 71 
27 Chile 67 
30 Portugal 64 
34 Israel 61 
36 Poland 60 
36 Slovenia 60 
38 Czech Republic 59 
41 Latvia 58 
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41 Spain 58 
45 Korea, South 57 
53 Italy 52 
57 Slovakia 50 
64 Hungary 46 
67 Greece 45 
78 Turkey 41 
138 Mexico 28 
(Source: Transparency International)  
 
There are two types of corruption in modern bureaucratic society: a. power-related 
corruption, b. living related corruption. Power-related corruption is when senior officials or 
politicians are involved, which can have major impact on the society. Living related corruption 
is conducted by street-level bureaucrats. This misdeed is carried out on a relatively smaller 
scale, but is generally widespread in both central and district administrations. 
In this study, power-related corruption is mainly discussed, because it is one of the 
most critical social problems that impede the accumulation of social capital as well as it 
negatively contributes to societal learning effect of corruption. Although there are dozens of 
factors of corruption, nepotism is one of the key cultural reasons for corruption. According to 
Kim (1990), the causes of corruption are divided into three: a. personal characteristics b. 
social and cultural factors (group consciousness, loyalty, sense of gratitude) c. institutional 
and managerial factors (absence of legal system and law enforcements). Nepotism is viewed 
as a cause of corruption in social and cultural aspects of the Korean society.  
Corruption occurs when people, rather than reasonable and objective standards, make 
decisions solely based on personal connections and distort the efficient allocation of 
resources. It is vital to analyze the relationship between corruption and authority. During the 
last three decades, total of 182 corruption cases in Korea have been reported by the Korean 
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media. According to Cha (2017), public and private sector relationships most frequently 
hosted corruption. High social status and corruption rate also showed a positive correlation. 
 
[Table 6] The Rate of Hosted Corruption and the Social Status Involved 
(Unit: number of accidents) 
Hosted corruption Social status involved 
Public sector Private sector 
Public and 
private sector 
High rank Middle rank Low rank 
49 
(26.9%) 
52 
(28.6%) 
75 
(41.2%) 
153 
(44.3%) 
117 
(33.9%) 
75 
(21.7%) 
(Source: Cha, 2017)  
  
 Again, power-related corruption usually takes place between business men, senior 
civil servants and first-line government officials. Business men initiate the relationship by 
bribing senior civil servants to order street-level bureaucrats so that they may exercise greater 
influence in their business field.  
  
B. Korea’s Type of Corruption: Elite Cartels 
According to Johnston, there are four types of corruption: a. autocracy, b. clan, c. 
elite cartel, d. market lobby (KBS, 2017). Johnston argues that first two types of corruption 
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are mostly observed in under-developed countries. In contrast, the latter two are mainly found 
in developed countries such as Korea. More specifically, elite cartels are the main conductors 
of corruption in Korea. This type of corruption is when ruler castes such as politicians, senior 
civil servants, and conglomerates form an exclusive and nepotism network to monopolize 
power and authority to gain unlawful benefits. The corruption by the elite cartels nests in 
governments when various institutional failures such as bulky governments, unproductive 
parliaments, dysfunctional courts and political party system are present. Nepotism is used as 
a tool of connection to fortify such exclusive network.  
 
[Table 7] Four types of corruption 
Type of corruption Autocracy Clan Elite cartel Market lobby 
Countries 
China, 
Indonesia 
Russia, 
Philippines 
South Korea, 
Italy 
The United States, 
England, Japan, 
Canada 
(Source: KBS, 20175)  
   
C. Analysis on Korea’s Power-Related Corruption Cases 
In this chapter, most representative power-related corruption cases regarding to 
nepotism will be discussed. This research seeks to conduct two case studies in order to 
                                           
5 The original source: Michael Johnston. (2005). Syndromes of Corruption.  
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analyze the effect and the magnitude nepotism had in power-related corruptions.  
 
i. Case 1: Nara Banking Corporation’s Illegal Lobby Incident   
Nara Banking Corporation was established in 1982 and was ordered to suspend their 
business in the year 2000 by the Financial Supervisory Commission. However, it was 
discovered that the president of Nara Banking Corporation tried to breakthrough his corporate 
bankruptcy by bribing political circles and scouting Mr. Ahn who had broad connections in 
the Jeolla-do as a representative director. The president of the institute provided 3 billion 
Korean won to Mr. Ahn, money needed for lobbying politicians and other interest groups. He 
sought to utilize all political ties to “persuade” Financial Supervisory Commission not to 
make decision of Nara Banking Corporation’s liquidation. Personnel who were involved in 
the bribery ranged from Chief Presidential Secretary of the National Assembly, chairperson 
of Financial Supervisory Commission, and more. Their shared connections were school ties, 
blood ties, and regionalism.  
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[Picture 3] Network of Nara Banking Corporation’s Illegal Lobby Incident 
 
 
This specific case hints that nepotism may act as a catalyst for power-related 
corruptions. People charged with corruption were mostly sentenced with probation. 
Congressmen and major politicians faced relatively lighter punishment compared to other 
public officials (Kim et al, 2006b). This suggests that there is a room for improving fairness 
of judgement and punishment in the judicial system so that general population trust the 
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justice of the society.  
 
[Picture 4] Cycle of Power-Related Corruption 
 
  
 
ii. Case 2: Presidential Election Bribery Incident 
In 2002, during the 16th presidential election, presidential candidate Lee’s campaign 
was charged with bribery of around 82.3 billion Korean won from Korea’s major 
conglomerates. One of the campaign executive, who was responsible judicial affairs, was 
Lee’s high school and university alumni. He played a critical role in the bribery by personally 
delivering truck full of money to Lee. It was revealed that corporate giants such as Samsung, 
Businessman
Senior public 
officials, 
politicians
(Street-level 
bureaucrats)
Public authority 
Giving 
economic 
benefits 
Bribing 
Ordering to abuse public 
administrations favorable to 
specific group of people 
(Sometimes, this process is 
omitted)  
Abusing 
of power 
40 
 
 
Hyundai, LG, and SK all offered more than 10 billion Korean Won to Lee, respectively. 
However, again, the head of conglomerates faced light punishment as the court was 
supposedly concerned with “the social cost and negative impact their imprisonment will have 
on the economy”. 
 
iii. Nepotism in Elite Cartel 
Power-related corruption as abuse of nepotism is not an old story. Recently, illegal 
employment request of high-ranking officials was a controversial topic of the political circles. 
One of the cases is “Kang-won land” incident. The company is entertaining public enterprise 
under the influence of Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. It runs Casino as well as other 
leisure facilities. Kang-won land was established in 1998 to recover the economy of closed 
mine area in Kang-won-do which underwent economic recession as the coal industry 
stagnated. The company was expected to boost the economy by employing the local talent. 
However, it was revealed that ALL of the applicants, around 500 people who passed the 
entrance examination in 2012 and 2013, requested special consideration for a job position 
through connections before they were accepted. 
Especially, the number of the applicants who requested special consideration in the 
name of the president of Kang-won land reached 267. It was suspected that congressmen and 
power organizations were implicated in the crime. The vice-president of the company, who 
exerted influence on the dishonest acceptance of 30 applicants, confessed that he was 
requested by regional important figures in the prosecutorial investigation. Even though the 
connection among the people directly involved was not clearly revealed, there can be a 
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certain connection among them based on nepotism. 
As discussed earlier, it is certain that nepotism has great influence on important 
decision makings; and if shown at a senior government level, for example appointing high 
ranking public officials. To pinpoint the effect of nepotism on the tip of the social pyramid, 
Jang (2014) used “Joins”, a biographic intelligence database of “big players” in both public 
and private sector as a reference. According to Jang (2014), a person in legal profession with 
the most school ties among the elite group had in total of 1,758 alumni from among 31,800 
figures in the database. This figure only counts the people who attended and graduated school 
within a close time frame.  
In addition, “The economist” reported in 2008 that Former President Lee Myung Bak 
had shallow political ground. The article suggested that in a pun on the name of a famous 
actress, South Korean call it “Ko So Young”. “Ko” refers to his alma mater, Korea University, 
which has supplied him with prospective ministers and aides (The Economist, 2008). Jang 
(2014) also suggests, elites born in 1950s made network based on school ties - privileged 
middle and high schools - since their teenage. The elites born in the 1960s seemed to divert 
from the traditional secondary education networks due to education equalization policy, but 
ultimately regressed back to sending their children to Ivy leagues or special-purpose high 
schools to partake in school ties. Also, another big cluster of networks are matrimonial 
connections. Out of 31,800 registered personnel, 1,380 were part of a large family. 
 
D. Relationship between Power-Related Corruption and Social Capital  
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There are several researches that studied the relationships between institutional trust 
and social capital. This chapter analyzes how power-related corruption deteriorates social 
capital and how corruption reduces the level of institutional trust. 
According to Bo & Dietlind (2008), people tend to categorize institutional trust into 
separate brackets. The aggregate level of generalized trust is more affected by the conducts of 
order institutions compared to their elected counterparts. Order institutions indicate the 
judicial system and the police which are the symbols for impartiality and fairness. When 
people feel discriminated or feel as they receive unfair treatment from these institutions, the 
overall trust decreases. In this sense, recovery of trust in judicial system and police is 
significant to accumulate social capital in Korea.  
Moreover, according to Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris (1999), there is strong 
correlation between social trust and public confidence in the institutions. He suggests that 
social trust can decrease when the public confidence in institutions falter due to 
unsatisfactory governmental performance. For this reason, Korea’s senior civil servants 
involved in power-related corruption negatively impact social trust. 
 Low social capital is going to likely cause people to exercise negative nepotism 
behaviors. Thus, tailored institutional reform must be realized in order to eliminate power-
related corruptions. There are some referential cases such as Singapore and Hong Kong 
where strict and transparent regulations against corruption do exist and “nobles oblige” is 
more often observed. 
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6. Conclusion   
 
A. Conclusion    
There is a controversy whether nepotism stems from Confucianism or not regarding 
the origin of nepotism. However, the reason why nepotism has lasted after the 
industrialization of Korean society is related to the fact that public institutions have not been 
trustworthy and the society has not been successfully transformed to a modernized nation, 
going through Japanese colonization, Korean War, and government-led rapid economic 
development. The public did not have a choice but to rely on nepotism network as a survival 
strategy. In reality, Korean social trust toward major social organizations as well as other 
people except for intimate group such as family is now at a low level. 
Nepotism, a traditional value of Korean society, is still found in social relationships 
and power-related corruption in the contemporary Korean society. Participation rate for 
nepotism network such as alumni gathering or family unions are much higher compared to 
other networks in the survey of both 2006 and 2015. The participation rate for nepotism 
network reached 31% for each year. Furthermore, gap of participation rate between nepotism 
network and activities for public good indicates the fact that Korea’s civic society has not 
fully matured. Also, nepotism acts as a connection through which the ruling castes can be 
linked. In order to overcome the corruption brought by nepotism, it is vital to introduce 
policy regulations to prevent corruptions, because it is studied that losing confidence in 
government or court, which has huge impact to the public, leads to weakening social capital 
of overall society. Singapore or Hong Kong, city states with similar cultural backgrounds to 
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Korea, would be ideal examples to refer to.  
Some defines Korea as a prismatic society where social value system are in the 
process of divergence. This argument is quite persuasive, because the way of thinking and 
pattern of behaviors seem to be changing as technological development is intensified. For 
instance, untact network is getting prevalent as online-based communities are increased. 
Meetings and group activities become more easily disassembled and gathered than before. 
People do not define their realm of social activities within the nepotism network.  
Nevertheless, societal ruling groups such as high-ranking officials and head of 
conglomerates have still shown nepotism-based pattern of behaviors in their public position. 
This damages to overall society when they are distorted to power-related corruption. 
Nepotism is a factor that incurs corruption. Particularly, nepotism serves as a bridge that pulls 
people into groups based on certain attributes of collective interest, major factors being 
regionalism, school ties, and blood ties. Such hazardous connections can become a catalyst 
for corruption in both individual and institutional levels. Therefore, it is vital to improve the 
law system and institutions to prevent corruptions and build up justice, which leads to 
progress of social capital.  
Consequently, the modernization theory which suggests economic development leads 
to overall societal change, does not fully explain Korean case of modernization. It is more 
accurate to state that Korea has undergone its unique development path paved by its own 
historical and cultural backgrounds. Korea did find economic success by adopting the 
western model, however strong sense of nepotism still remains inseparable part of the Korean 
society. 
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B. Limitations  
The lack of in-sight information on private network of social relationships and 
corruptions pose as a challenge. As private interaction between actors and groups are not 
always available to the public, key information needed for isolating the fundamental cause 
might be limited. This research too, mostly references to news articles and previous research 
open to the public eye, therefore further research on how respective nepotism network operated 
is required. 
Moreover, it must be taken into account that, tapping into the private realm of human 
relationships has its share of fundamental limitations because it is personal domain. Thus, 
solely analyzing the social relationships in order to understand the widespread of nepotism in 
the Korean society is insufficient. Likewise, a few identical limitations on measuring nepotism 
behaviors should be recognized when citing this paper. First, properly measuring the exclusive 
solidarity of alumni (university or above level) within a company poses as a challenge. Also, 
since the complexity and connectivity of a social network are getting deepened, it is difficult 
to appropriately categorize the social network. For example, sorting out club activities 
organized by alumni based on nepotism from the social group distribution needs further 
research. Therefore, it is difficult to understand how much dominant nepotism is in the Korean 
society by looking into participation rate for various kinds of social group activities.  
A limitation of survey for 2015 is that it does not inquire how much active people are 
for the cyber communities. Considering online based communication and group activities are 
getting increased, the survey is bounded to see the picture of social relationships. Still, it is 
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researched that nepotism is valid in the Korean society. According to Lee (2005), the solidity 
and weight nepotism in Korea carry compared to other East-Asian societies under 
Confucianism is far more beneficial. Also, Jang (2008) explains that traditional network based 
on nepotism has been reproduced and persistent in Korea which already achieved 
modernization.  
 
C. Suggestions for Further Research  
For the further research, there are some suggestions. First, it is critical to have data on 
online activities of people in order to see social relationships more accurately, because people 
tend to be more active online than before. And this trend is getting intensified. For example, it 
is needed to do survey of which group is the most frequently connected by Social Network 
Service(SNS) such as Facebook and Instagram, Blogs, and club activities online. Not only 
that, chat rooms on mobile phone such as “kakaotalk”, “wechat” and “whatsapp” are also 
places where people most frequently communicate with others. These online platforms are 
places where people form network ordinary connections as well as the people sharing similar 
concerns.  
Also, there is another way to understand people’ social relationships when people’s 
network becomes online-basis. It is useful to investigate how much money people spend or 
contribute to each group for meetings or common purposes, because people gather money in 
order to organize regular meetings or activities and celebrations of the members, etc. It is 
reasonable to guess that people participate more or put a premium on some group activities 
where they spend more money.  
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Second, it is crucial to figure out the principle of forming “exclusive network” in elite 
cartel in current society, because the connections get more complicated and diversified. As 
the social class of Korean society gets solidified, and more ultimately the society becomes 
diversified, the connections in elite cartel are not just categorized by nepotism network.  
 Last but not least, it is significant to look into the reason why nepotism has been 
continued and solidified during the modernization. It has rarely been studied 
comprehensively to find the characteristics of Korea’s governance or institutional inertia 
which made a room for nepotism to work, distorting the allocation of public resources and 
weakening the public confidence in institutions and authority. In other words, research on the 
social systemic factors of Korea’s modernization periods that weakened social capital of the 
society should be undertaken. 
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